Abstract: A novel asymmetric image encryption and authentication scheme based on equal modulus decomposition (EMD) in the Fresnel transform domain is proposed. First, the Fresnel spectrum of the plaintext is sparsely sampled. Then a sparse presentation of the Fresnel spectrum is divided into two complex-valued masks with equal modulus based on EMD, both of which are necessary for decryption and authentication. The decrypted image renders little information on the original image visually. Furthermore, a nonlinear correlation is used to authenticate the decrypted image with the plaintext. In the scheme proposed here, the illuminating wavelength and the diffraction distance strengthen the security of the proposed scheme significantly, and the two complex-valued masks are both essential for decryption and authentication. The percentage of extracted pixels does not have to be determined deliberately. The feasibility and validity of the scheme have been proved by numerical simulations.
Introduction
Since Refregier and Javidi [1] proposed the classical double random-phase encoding (DRPE) scheme, optical image encryption has attracted more and more researchers due to its parallelism and high freedom [1] - [7] . Afterwards, DRPE was extended into the Fresnel transform domain [8] , the fractional Fourier transform domain [4] , the multi-parameter fractional Fourier transform domain [3] , the gyrator transform domain [9] , and the fractional random transform domain [10] to enlarge their encryption key spaces. Furthermore, many other optical techniques, such as coherent diffraction imaging [11] , optical interference [12] - [14] , joint transform correlation [15] , and digital holography [16] , [17] , have been used for image encryption, and many great improvements have been achieved.
Several researchers have found that the DRPE scheme cannot endure some traditional attacks [7] , [18] , [19] . To enhance its security and extend its applications, Pérez-Cabré et al. [20] proposed a new cryptosystem combining DRPE with a photon-counting imaging technique in which a sparse representation of the encrypted image is used as ciphertext for image decryption and authentication. The decrypted image cannot render valuable information visually, but it can be authenticated by nonlinear correlation. Hence, sparsity authentication can supply extra protection and make the encryption system no longer vulnerable against such attacks. Besides the photon-counting imaging technique, sparse sampling [21] , [22] is also used in DRPE for sparsity authentication, in which the pixels of the encrypted image are extracted sparsely.
Furthermore, the optical interference-based encryption (IBE) [12] scheme inherently suffers from the silhouette problem [14] . Several silhouette removal methods have been proposed [14] , [23] - [28] . Recently, an asymmetric optical cryptosystem based on equal modulus decomposition (EMD) [29] has been proposed. In this method, the ciphertext and the private key are obtained through a digital operation without phase truncation. However, an attacker can recover the original image through an amplitude phase-retrieval algorithm (APRA) [30] . In addition, an intruder can access the exact private key and obtain precise attack results using an iterative phase-retrieval algorithm (IPRA) [31] .
To enhance the security of an EMD-based cryptosystem, for the first time in the authors' knowledge, this study combines EMD with sparse sampling for image authentication. In the encryption process, the plaintext is normalized, attached by a random phase mask, and Fresnel transformed. The Fresnel spectrum is sparsely sampled and then separated into two masks with equal modulus based on EMD. In the decryption process, the decrypted image can be easily obtained optically or digitally, but little information can be recognized using the naked eye. Because only a noise-like decrypted image can be obtained even using the correct security keys during decryption, a nonlinear correlation is further used to authenticate the decrypted image with the plaintext. The Fresnel transform used in our scheme can enlarge the key space. Moreover, our scheme for decryption and authentication need the two masks. And it cannot be limited by the percentage of extracted pixels. Simulation results show that our scheme is a secure and efficient way for image encryption and authentication. Figure 1 shows the flowchart of the proposed encryption process. EMD indicates the equal modulus decomposition process, FrT means the Fresnel transform operation, and SS denotes the sparse sampling operation.
Theoretical Analysis
The encryption process can be described as follows:
where (x, y) and (u, v) represent the coordinates in the spatial and Fresnel domains respectively, FrT{} indicates the Fresnel transform operator, the subscript d denotes the propagation distance between the masks and the CCD plane, the subscript λ denotes the wavelength of the illumination laser beams, and R(x, y) indicates a random function uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1]. Next, S(u, v) is sparsely sampled through a binary amplitude mask (BAM), B1(u, v), to acquire the sparse spectrum, SS(u, v), as follows:
B1(u, v) contains zeroes and ones, and the percentage of ones contained in B1(u, v) determines the number of effective pixels extracted from the Fresnel spectrum. The amplitude part of SS(u, v) is A(u, v) = |SS(u, v)|, and the phase part of SS(u, v) is ϕ(u, v) = arg{SS(u, v)}, where the operators " " and "arg{}" indicate the modulus and the argument of a function respectively. Figure 2 shows the use of EMD to separate SS(u, v) into two complex-valued masks with equal modulus.
As shown in Fig. 2 , SS(u, v) is divided into two masks P 1 (u, v) and P 2 (u, v), which have the same modulus. θ(u, v) can be expressed as:
where R(u, v) indicates a random function uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1]. Through simple geometrical deduction, P 1 (u, v) and P 2 (u, v) can be obtained as:
In the proposed scheme, P 1 (u, v) is treated as the ciphertext, P 2 (u, v) acts as the private key, and R(x, y) and θ(u, v) are treated as public keys. The illuminating wavelength λ and the diffraction distance d are used as additional encryption keys.
The decryption process can be described as follows. According to the principle of EMD:
Using Eqs. (1) and (6):
The image SI(x, y), which contains little information on the plaintext, is nonlinearly correlated with its corresponding original image:
N C(x, y) = I F T F T [I (x, y)]F T [SI (x, y)]
w
where w defines the strength of the applied nonlinearity.
Numerical Simulation and Discussions
Numerical simulations were performed to show the feasibility and validity of the proposed scheme. In this simulation, the axial distance was set to 50 mm, and the wavelength of the collimated plane wave was 633 nm. Figure 3(a) shows the original image "Lena" with a size of 256 × 256 pixels. Figure 3(b) shows the phase distribution of the public key R(x, y) used in the encryption procedure, and Fig. 3(c) shows the Fresnel spectrum of the plaintext. After sparse sampling by a B1 with 10% of ones as shown in Fig. 3(d) , the sparse spectrum is shown in Fig. 3(e) . Then the public key θ(u,v) ( Fig. 3(f) ) is used to separate the sparse spectrum into two complex-valued matrices. The real parts of the private key and the ciphertext are shown in Figs. 
3(g) and 3(h).
When all the security keys are correct, the recovered image is as shown in Fig. 4(a) . Clearly, the information related to the primary image cannot be observed by the naked eye because of the use of the sparse sampling technique. However, the nonlinear correlation can be used to authenticate the decrypted image. The authentication result for Fig. 4(a) is shown in Fig. 4(d) , where one relatively prominent peak can be observed. Therefore, this scheme can reveal the existence and correctness of the original image that is hidden within.
The ciphertext and the private key are both important for this cryptosystem. When only P 1 (u, v) is used for decryption, the decrypted image is shown in Fig. 4(b) , and the nonlinear correlation result for Fig. 4(b) is shown in Fig. 4 (e). When only P 2 (u, v) is used for decryption, the decrypted image is shown in Fig. 4(c) , and the nonlinear correlation result for Fig. 4(c) is shown in Fig. 4(f) . 6 . Authentication results when the sampling ratio is 50%. Authentication results of the proposed scheme using (a) P 1 and P 2 , (b) P 1, and (c) P 2 , respectively. Authentication results ((d)-(f)) described in [32] using (a) both ciphertexts, (b) and (c) each of two ciphertexts, respectively.
Obviously, P 1 (u,v) and P 2 (u, v) are both essential for image decryption and authentication. Even if all the correct keys and the correct ciphertext are used for decryption, the decrypted image still cannot be recognized by illegal users, so that the vulnerability of EMD to APRA [30] and IPRA [31] attacks can be overcome.
In addition to the EMD in the Fresnel transform domain, the illuminating wavelength and the diffraction distance are additional keys and play important roles in decryption and authentication. When another illuminating wavelength (640 nm) is used for decryption, the decrypted image is shown in Fig. 5(a) , and its authentication result is shown in Fig. 5(b) . When another diffraction distance (49 mm) is used for decryption, the decrypted image is shown in Fig. 5(c) , and its authentication result is shown in Fig. 5(d) . Clearly not only is it impossible to observe the original image, but image authentication fails when the wavelength or the diffraction distance is wrong.
The percentage of extracted pixels is a critical and difficult issue in image authentication based on interference [32] . When the percentage exceeds a certain threshold, the ciphertext cannot render a peak in the nonlinear correlation. However, this problem is solved in the proposed scheme. Figures  6(a)-6(c) show authentication examples corresponding to a percentage of 50%. Obviously, only when the ciphertext P 1 and the private key P 2 are both used for decryption can the authentication succeed. The same illuminating wavelength, the same diffraction distance, and the same percentage of extracted pixels were used in the scheme described in [32] , and the authentication results are shown in Figs. 6(d)-6(f) . When the percentage of extracted pixels is 50%, each of two phase-only masks (POMs) can render a peak in their authentication distributions, which clearly decreases the security of the method. However, in the scheme proposed here, even if the percentage of extracted pixels is as high as 50%, neither of the two masks can render anything about the original image. This means that the proposed scheme does not need to estimate the maximum percentage of extracted pixels deliberately to ensure that the ciphertext and the private key do not bring about unintentional information disclosure.
Conclusion
This paper has presented a new asymmetric image encryption and authentication scheme using equal modulus decomposition of a sparse Fresnel spectrum. To the best knowledge of the authors, this is the first time that EMD technology has been integrated into image authentication. The illumination wavelength and diffraction distance of the Fresnel transform provide additional keys for security improvement. Furthermore, in the proposed scheme, the ciphertext and the private key do not lead to unintentional information disclosure regardless of the percentage of extracted pixels.
